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E

ven after the U.S. economy
recovers, there are likely to be
considerable long-term employment
problems for the disadvantaged. For
example, even in 2006, when the U.S.
economy was near a business cycle peak,
employment rates for less-educated male
workers were still well below where
they were 30 years ago. To match lesseducated male employment rates from
1979, the United States in 2006 would
have needed to add about 3 million jobs
(Bartik and Houseman 2008). In addition,
employment rates of less-educated
unmarried women in 2006 were still well
below those of men, even though under
welfare reform these women are expected
to work and be self-supporting.
In addition to finding ways of
expanding job training programs and
improving educational attainment, we
need approaches to expanding labor
demand for disadvantaged workers.
Studies have shown that if disadvantaged
workers can be hired for entry-level
jobs and stay employed for at least six
months, they gain valuable labor market
experience, self-confidence, and a better
reputation with employers, all of which
increase their long-term employability
and earnings.
In my 2001 book Jobs for the
Poor: Can Labor Demand Policies
Help? (Bartik 2001, chaps. 8 and
10) I suggest that the United States
establish a permanent version of a
program that Minnesota tried in the
1980s, the MEED program. MEED at
first stood for Minnesota Emergency
Employment Development, and later for
Minnesota Employment and Economic
Development.

Under my proposed national version
of MEED, the federal government would
provide wage subsidies of up to $8 an
hour for employers who hire unemployed
workers referred by local workforce
agencies for newly created positions.
For several reasons, the program would
be a discretionary program administered
by local workforce agencies. First, this
would allow the program to be integrated
with local workforce programs. Second,
a discretionary program could be
selective in targeting employers who
would be most willing to offer good job
experiences to disadvantaged workers.
Third, a discretionary program could
target disadvantaged workers who
would be good matches for interested
employers, which would increase the
effectiveness of the program.
The subsidies would go to newly
created positions to minimize
displacement. This program is intended
to increase total employment rather than
to substitute disadvantaged workers for
other workers.
The wage subsidies would target
small businesses and small nonprofit
employers. The evidence suggests that
these smaller employers may be the most
responsive to a wage subsidy. Including
both for-profit and nonprofit employers
also allows the program to provide a wide
variety of job experiences, and to provide
both private and public services.
The wage subsidies would fund up to
six months of labor market experience.
Employers would be encouraged to roll
over those hired into permanent job slots.
Employers that abused the wage subsidy
system would be excluded from future
subsidies.
Evidence from the MEED program
suggests that such a program can

be successfully run on a large scale.
Furthermore, studies find that about
half of the jobs subsidized would not
have been created but for MEED. The
program was run in Minnesota on a scale
that would be equivalent to having about
600,000 annual participants on a national
level (Rode 1988).
A program run at a similar level
nationally in the United States might
cost about $8 billion a year. This would
include both the cost of the wage
subsidy and the costs of various types
of job training and social support for
disadvantaged workers who are hired.
The long-term effects of this program
should be regularly monitored through
a performance-monitoring system. This
system would track the postprogram
employment and earnings history of
program participants, compared to similar
nonparticipants.
The research literature on wage
subsidies suggests that such a program
may have long-term effects. Perhaps
20 percent of the extra employment
experience of program participants in
the short run is likely to be reflected in
increases in long-term employment rates
of program participants. If run over a
sustained period, this program has the
potential to make a substantial dent
in the depressed employment rates of
disadvantaged groups.
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